Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Management Faculty Research and
Publications

Management, Department of

Summer 2003

Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology
Industries: Implications for Industrial Policy
David R. King
Marquette University

John D. Driessnack
USAF

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/mgmt_fac
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
King, David R. and Driessnack, John D., "Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology
Industries: Implications for Industrial Policy" (2003). Management Faculty Research and Publications.
102.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/mgmt_fac/102

Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2003

260

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE

2. REPORT TYPE

2003

N/A

3. DATES COVERED

-

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-Technology
Industries: Implications for Industrial Policy

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Defense Acquisition University Alumni Association 2550 Huntington Ave,
Suite 202 Alexandria, VA 22303
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT

b. ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

unclassified

unclassified

unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER
OF PAGES

UU

24

19a. NAME OF
RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

OPINION
Investigating the Integration of Acquired
Firms in High-technology Industries

INVESTIGATING THE INTEGRATION
OF ACQUIRED FIRMS IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Maj David R. King, USAF and Lt Col John D. Driessnack, USAF
Acquisition activity persists despite evidence that acquisitions do not improve
firm performance. Further, government policy toward the defense industry has
advocated consolidation in the name of nominal cost savings. We explore the
role acquisitions play toward technology transfer and begin to identify factors
associated with acquisition success through a review of existing research on
post-acquisition performance that primarily considers acquiring firm stock
performance. Using this research as a foundation, we build a model to analyze
post-acquisition performance using a sample of high-technology firms. Results
suggest critical success factors associated with post-acquistion stock
performance are poorly understood. We conclude that proactive government
policy toward high-technology industry mergers and acquisitions may be
misguided due to difficulty in predicting acquisition outcomes.

M

erger and acquisition activity in
volves discrete events associated
with a high tempo of change that
modify the competitive dynamics of
affected industries. Merged firms combine
additional resources and capacity that can
threaten the market position and profitability of remaining firms. The implications
of using acquisitions to alter competition

in industry may carry higher stakes in
high-technology industries, because hightechnology firms are an important source
of U.S. economic competitiveness and are
key components of the defense industrial
base.
The Department of Defense (DoD)
encouraged merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity after then Deputy Sec-

DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
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retary of Defense William Perry told
defense industry executives that declining defense spending required consolidation. The 1993 meeting became
known as the “Last Supper” and in the
next four years the
value of defense mergers was eight times the
“Acquiring
level of the preceding
technology
four years (Augustine,
is often the
1997). In a controversial
motivation
for acquiring
program that became to
another firm.”
be known as payoffs
for layoffs, the DoD, in
an effort to help realize
expected cost savings, reimbursed defense firms for the cost of merging. The
program, to date, has resulted in $4.77
billion in DoD savings with a corresponding cost of $869 million
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2002), or
approximately one percent of the 2003
defense budget.
Firms pursue acquisitions to increase
performance (Finkelstein, 1997); however,
research findings on the impact of an
acquisition on acquiring firm performance
remains inconclusive (e.g., Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991; Sirower, 1997). Given the
high level and dollar of acquisition activity, research needs to identify factors
associated with acquisition success. The
goal of the current paper is to begin to
answer the following policy questions:
1. Does technology transfer occur when
high-technology firms are acquired?
2. Is it reasonable to anticipate investor
benefits from defense industry
consolidation?

TECHNOLOGY AS A MOTIVATION
FOR ACQUISITIONS
Acquiring technology is often the
motivation for acquiring another firm. In
reviewing the different perspectives
toward acquiring technology, two conflicting perspectives dominate. Researchers
tend to either view external technology as
a substitute for Barkema and Vermeulen
(1998) Bower (2001) or a complement to
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) internal
innovation. Either view has implications
for technology transfer.
In the current sample1, the average
research and development (R&D) intensity for acquiring firms was significantly
below the average for firms in their
industry (p < .001), suggesting that firms
use acquisitions as a substitute for R&D or
that acquired technology is used as a substitute for internal innovation.
However, acquirers still perform R&D
and it may provide a facilitating role to acquiring external technology. This idea relates to the concept of absorptive capacity, or the ability of a firm to recognize,
assimilate, and convert new information
to commercial ends, that is built up through
R&D investment (Cohen & Levinthal,
1989, 1990). If firms acquire high-technology firms for the express purpose of
assimilating a target firm’s technology,
there are clear implications for the acquisition of U.S. companies by foreign firms.
For example, ASM Lithography Holding NV, a Dutch company, and its May 2001
acquisition of Silicon Valley Group (SVG)
Inc. was delayed, because of national-security issues with a SVG subsidiary, Tinsley,
which makes lens polishing technology for
chip equipment, satellites, and missile
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guidance systems (Clark & Simpson,
2001). However, the acquisition was
later approved and completed in May
2001 with the caveat ASM Lithography
try to divest Tinsley over a six month
period (Simpson, 2001).2
Without national security issues the
acquisition of SVG would have been
approved, because the Exon-Florio foreign acquisition law does not allow for
consideration of economic issues (Simpson, 2001). Foreign firms accounted for
approximately five percent of the acquisitions of U.S. high-technology firms
between 1994 and 1997, and this may be
an area for expanding anti-trust policy. The
impact of the technology transferred on
U.S. economic competitiveness is unknown, and represents an opportunity for
additional research.

FACTORS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED
WITH ACQUISITION SUCCESS
Similar to previous studies, the current
sample of acquisitions, on average, did not
lead to abnormal returns for acquiring firms.
However, some acquisitions performed better than others, so what factors are associated with acquisition success? A literature
review of 46 empirical studies of post-acquisition performance published since
Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) review identified little overlap in the studies that researchers considered important in explaining postacquisition performance.3 We include the
most commonly studied variables in our
analysis to avoid statistical artifacts from
missing variables. The logic behind the most
commonly studied variables, the generally
anticipated impact of each variable on
post-acquisition performance, and their

significance in the current study are
shown in Table 1. The following sections
further discuss this material.

DIVERSIFICATION
The impact of firm diversification on
subsequent performance has received the
most attention of researchers with some
measure of relatedness considered in 30
of the 46 studies. Diversification involves
whether a firm acquires another firm in
its same industry, a related acquisition, or
a firm in a different industry. Although
no relationship between acquiring a related versus an unrelated firm and postacquisition performance has been found
in some studies (e.g., Fowler & Schmidt,
1989), the preponderance of literature
suggests acquiring related firms leads to
increased post-acquisition performance
(e.g., Kusewitt, 1985).
Current results are consistent with
existing research in that the acquisition of
related targets leads to higher post-acquisition performance (p < .05; one-tail). However, the observed relationship is relatively
“Diversification
weak with the degree
involves whether
that a target firm relates
a firm acquires
to an acquirer only exanother firm in
plaining 2.1 percent of
its same industry,
subsequent stock market
a related acquisiperformance. Still, the
tion, or a firm in
results support viewing
a different
technological progress
industry.”
as largely path dependent with the implication
that acquiring firms are more likely to
search and find value in target firms in areas related to their existing technological
capabilities. The possiblity of increased performance may depend on a firm staying
in a related industry.
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Table 1. Common Post-Acquisition Performance Research Variables
a

Variable

Anticipated Impact on Performance

Current Findings

Diversification

Diversification (e.g., acquiring firms in non-related
industries) is expected to have a negative impact on
performance (see Berger & Ofek, 1995).

Expected impact is
supported (p < .05) and
explains 2.1% of the
variance in performance.

Relative Size
of Firms

The acquisition of smaller firms, in comparison to the
acquiring firm, is expected to be easier and result in
higher performance (see Kusewitt,1985).

Expected impact is
supported (p < .01) and
explains 7.2% of the
variance in performance.

Acquisition
Experience

Acquisition experience is generally considered to
positively impact performance (see Hitt, Harrison,
& Ireland, 2001).

Expected impact is not
supported (p = .22).

Method of
Accounting

Purchase accounting is generally considered to have
a positive impact on performance (see Ravenscraft
& Scherer, 1987).

Expected impact is not
supported (p = .15).

R&D
Expenditures

R&D expenditures should improve post-acquisition
performance (see Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990).

Expected impact is not
supported (p = .41).

Friendliness
of Acquisition

Friendly acquisitions are expected to lead to higher
performance (see Kusewitt, 1985).

Not examined due to an
insufficient occurrence of
hostile high-technology
acquisitions.

Debt Level

Firms with lower debt levels are more likely to
experience higher performance (see Haspeslagh
& Jemison, 1991).

Expected impact is
supported (p < .05), and
explains 3.0% of the
variance in performance.

Form of
Acquisition

Tender offers, in contrast to mergers, lead to higher
performance (see Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991).

Expected impact is
supported (p < .10), and
explains 1.8% of the
variance in performance.

Target Firm
Performance

There are conflicting perspectives on how target firm
performance will impact an acquiring firm’s postacquisition performance. Researchers support
viewing post-acquisition performance as independent
of target firm performance (Anand & Singh, 1997),
distressed targets leading to higher performance
(Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994), or profitable targets
leading to higher performance (Mahoney & Pandian,
1992).

Current results suggest
that acquiring firm
profitability is not related
to post-acquisition
performance (p = .15).

a

One-tail tests of significance.
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In constrast to this finding, defense
firms that are prime contractors have
tended to make acquisitions that both
consolidate specific industries (e.g., aircraft and Lockheed’s purchase of General Dynamic’s aerospace unit) as well
as across industries (e.g., aircraft and
ships with Northrop Grumman’s purchase of Newport News Shipbuilding).
However, defense firms appear to have
generally chosen to focus on acquiring
other firms in defense industry and not
expanding into commerical markets. It
is possible that the specialization of defense firms in relating to their unique
customer, the government, provides
them an advantage that does not correspond to traditional industry boundaries.

RELATIVE SIZE OF FIRMS
The ability of an acquiring firm to
assimilate a target firm may be impacted
by their relative size simply because it is
easier for a larger firm to integrate
resources from a smaller firm. Kitching
(1967) found that unsuccessful acquisitions correlated strongly between firms of
similar size. Acquisition risk may be reduced if the target firm is large enough to
achieve ‘critical mass’ while remaining
smaller than the acquiring firm (Kusewitt,
1985), due to decreased financial strain
and integrative effort. Existing research
suggests that, in general, acquisitions of
smaller firms by larger firms should lead
to higher performance.
Current results indicate that larger
targets correlate with higher stock
gains (p < .01; one tail) and explain 7.2
percent of the observed variance in postacquisition performance. However, over
98 percent of the targets were still smaller
than the acquiring firm. This result appears

to confirm previous research that acquisition risk is reduced when a target is
smaller than an acquiring firm, but large
enough to demand enough management
attention to ensure proper integration.
For acquisitions involving large, prime
defense contractors, targets from this
point forward will most likely be smaller
than the prime defense contractors. This
suggests a potential post-acquisition performance advantage for prime contractors in the defense industry.

ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE
Experience from past acquisitions, at the
organizational level, may build facilitating
processes for the identification and integration of target firm resources that may
be required to improve post-acquisition
performance (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991). However, consistent findings on the
relationship between acquisition experience and
post-acquisition perfor“…Defense
mance do not exist. Still,
firms appear to
Hitt, Harrison, and Irehave generally
chosen to focus
land (2001) caution “the
on acquiring other
importance of the link
firms in defense
between managerial exindustry and not
perience and M&A sucexpanding into
cess should not be uncommerical
derestimated (p. 55).”
markets.”
Current results suggest that either hightechnology acquisitions are unique with acquisition experience not predicting post-acquisition performance (p = .22; one tail).
Alternatively, this result may imply that
firms could benefit from acquisition experience, and that managers simply
treat acquisitions as unique events.
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METHOD OF ACCOUNTING
Few studies control for accounting
method, even though it has been shown to
impact firm performance measures
(Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Historically, there have been two methods of
accounting for an acquisition — pooling
of interests or purchase.4 Under pooling
of interests, assets of an acquired firm
are recorded at their pre-merger book
value and the difference in amount paid
for a firm is either debited or credited to
“Friendly
acquirer’s stockholdacquisitions
ers equity account.
involve transacUnder purchase actions where an
counting, acquired asacquiring firm’s
sets are entered at the
overtures are not
effective price paid.
resisted by a
Pooling of interest actarget firm’s top
counting is signifimanagement.”
cantly associated with
higher acquisition premiums (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987)
and the premium paid negatively impacts post-acquisition performance
(Sirower, 1997). Current results suggest
that method of accounting does not
impact post-acquisition performance
(p = .15; one-tail).

internal technological capabilities that
help firms adapt to changing markets
(Zahra & Covin, 1993). Additionally,
more R&D intensive firms should be
more proactive in exploiting external opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
However, current results suggest that
there may be diminishing returns to
performing R&D beyond some threshold level. In other words, firms may only
need to perform enough R&D to remain
aware of external technology and maintain the ability to absorb needed technological developments.

FRIENDLINESS OF ACQUISITIONS
Friendly acquisitions involve transactions where an acquiring firm’s overtures
are not resisted by a target firm’s top management. Theory suggests friendly acquisition should lead to higher performance.
For example, Kusewitt (1985) simply
stated: “unfriendly takeovers should be
avoided (p. 166).” Consequently, hostile
acquisitions are relatively infrequent with
only 172 hostile acquisitions out of over
35,000 completed between 1976 and 1990
(Jensen, 1993). Therefore, whether an
acquisition was friendly is not included
in the current analysis, due to a lack of
observed hostile acquisitions.

R&D EXPENDITURE
Research suggests that increased technological capability enables firms to be
aware of the significance of new external
technology (Berry & Taggart, 1998). Nelson and Winter (1978) argue that the
capacity to recognize and exploit technological opportunities is a function of a
firm’s technology resource commitments,
such as R&D investments, and that firms
that track the progress of technology
tend to prosper. R&D investments build

DEBT LEVEL
The debt of an acquiring firm may
impact post-acquisition performance.
Unused debt capacity can be regarded as
a firm resource (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991), and if an acquiring firm cannot
afford the price demanded by a target, the
anticipated synergies in a combined company cannot be achieved. Additionally,
higher debt levels may lead to more
strict financial controls that can decrease
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performance (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson,
& Moesel, 1996). Present results suggest that firms with less debt experience
higher subsequent performance (p < .05;
one tail) with debt explaining three percent of the variance in an acquiring
firm’s post-acquisition performance. It
appears that increased debt levels represent an additional burden for acquiring
firms seeking increased performance.
This represents a challenge for most
defense firms since they carry relatively
large levels of debt and poor credit ratings (Defense Science Board, 2000).

FORM OF ACQUISITION
The form of an acquisition involves
the nature of the offer made by an acquiring firm with the primary choices
involving either a tender offer or a
merger Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991).
Tender offers, or proposals made directly to a target firm’s shareholders, are
made through public bids, while mergers, or negotiations directly with a target firm’s managers, are generally initiated under a veil of secrecy. Existing
research has found that tender offers
significantly outperform mergers (Rau
& Vermealen, 1998). Berkovitch and
Khanna (1991) propose that the difference in performance results from differences in the amount of information
made public during a tender offer versus a merger, where the greater information disclosure in tender offers leads
increased synergy. The basis of
Berkovitch and Khanna’s (1991) argument is that tender offers lead to greater
competition for a target firm. However,
an alternate explanation relevant to the
acquisition of technology resources is
that the increased information disclosure

of tender offers decreases the amount of
uncertainty target firm employees’
experience.
Acquisitions create uncertainty for employees in target firms leading to a tendency toward self-preservation that inhibits transfer of capabilities and resources
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Employee resistance to integration is particularly relevant in the assimilation of the
technology resources because the implicit
expertise of R&D personnel is far more
valuable than the technology they have
developed (Bower, 2001).
Whatever the ultimate
reason, acquisitions completed through a tender
“It appears
offer are expected to be
that increased
positively related to postdebt levels
acquisition performance.
represent an
Current results suggest
additional burden
that tender offers do lead
for acquiring
to higher post-acquisition
firms seeking
performance (p < .10;
increased
one tail) with form of acperformance.”
quisition explaining 1.8
percent of the variance in
post-acquisition performance. This result supports either tender offers resulting in increased competition or information disclosure leads to
increased post-acquisition performance.

TARGET FIRM PERFORMANCE
It seems reasonable that would-be
acquirers will evaluate the attractiveness
of a target firm’s resources in light of the
firm’s performance. However, consistent
guidance on the expected relationship
does not exist. There are at least three
possible relationships between target firm
performance and an acquiring firm’s
post-acquisition performance.
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First, acquiring firm’s may view target
firm profitability as a signal of the value
attached to its technological resources by
would-be acquirers. Specifically, it is possible that would-be acquirers will interpret positive profitability as the market’s
independent verification that the target
firm possesses valuable resources. High
profits signal uncertain imitability and the
more firm specific or rare a firm’s resources, the more likely the firm will earn
above normal rates of return (Mahoney
& Pandian, 1992). Therefore, higher postacquisition performance may result from
acquiring target firms that possess valuable resource combinations indicated by
higher profitability.
The second possibility is that, consistent with Bruton, Oviatt, and White’s
(1994) observations, acquirers are particularly attracted to distressed firms with
“…acquiring
resources of known or
firms consider
potential value to the
both distressed
acquirer. The assumpand highly
tion here is that the tarprofitable firms
get firm’s poor financial
as potential
performance is a reflecacquisition
tion of either resource
candidates.”
mismanagement or the
absence of complementary resources needed to create
competitive advantage. Thus, the acquisition of a poorly performing firm may
be attractive if the acquiring firm assumes it can improve the management
of the target firm’s resources or successfully combine them with its own, preexisting internal resources.
Third, it may be that target firm profitability has no impact on an acquiring
firm’s post-acquisition performance.
Anand and Singh (1997) suggest that

the benefit of transferring firm resources
in an acquisition is independent of the
acquired firm’s prior performance.
Therefore, in their opinion, acquiring
firms should seek targets with resources
they need without considering the profitability of the firms employing those
resources. Current results indicate that
target firm profitability in the year prior
to an acquisition is not related to postacquisition performance by an acquiring
firm (p = .15; one tail). This implies that
acquiring firms consider both distressed
and highly profitable firms as potential
acquisition candidates.

IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FORCES ON
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
The vast majority of acquisition research and the variables discussed so far
only consider the impact of variables
linked to factors internal to firms that can
be directly observed and to some extent
controlled. However, it is also reasonable that post-acquisition performance
depends on factors external to firms.
We consider two characteristics that
may influence post-acquisition performance. First, an acquiring firm’s environment is important because it sets the
competitive context, and rivalry over
scarce environmental resources and opportunities should influence firm actions
and subsequent performance. Industry
characteristics can influence the performance of firms (Porter, 1985). Further,
Bergh (1998) found the benefits of external technology were moderated by a
firm’s environment. Second, the timing
of an acquisition may impact an acquiring firm’s post-acquisition performance.

268

Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology Industries

Table 2. External Forces Influencing Post-Acquisition Performance
Variable

Anticipated Impact on Performance

Firm
Environment

Firms operating in more attractive
environments should experience higher
performance (see Dess & Beard, 1984).

Timing of
Acquisition

a

Current Findings a

1. Acquiring firms operating in
munificent environments are more
likely to experience higher
performance.

1. Munificence does not impact
post-acquisition performance
(p = .28).

2. Acquiring firms operating in less
dynamic environments are more
likely to experience higher
performance.

2. Dynamism does not impact
post-acquisition performance
(p = .42).

3. Acquiring firms operating in less
complex environments are more
likely to experience higher
performance.

3. Complexity is significant
(p < .05) and explains 2.4 %
of post-acquisition performance.

Early acquisitions should outperform
later acquisitions.

Mixed support, but the year an
acquisition was completed explained
4.7 % of post-acquisition
performance.

One-tail tests of significance

The impact of variables related to both
external factors on subsequent post-acquisition performance is summarized in
Table 2. The following sections further
discuss these relationships.

FIRM ENVIRONMENT
Research supports viewing a firm’s
environment as a multidimensional construct with three dimensions — munificence, dynamism, and complexity (e.g.,
Dess & Beard, 1984). Although the labels applied to the different dimensions
vary, there is an underlying commonality in the underlying concepts. For the

purposes of the present research, the effects of industry are controlled by computing firm measures relative to their
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code using the procedures
described by Keats and Hitt (1988).
Munificence relates to the scarceness
of environment resources that support
firm growth in a given industry (Dess &
Beard, 1984). This environmental dimension has been discussed within the population ecology literature under the label
of environmental carrying capacity
(Aldrich, 1979). Munificence is characteristically assumed to have a positive
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impact on firm performance and is calculated from changes in an industry’s
net sales and operating income during
the preceding five-year period.
Current results find that munificence is
not significant (p = .28; one tail) in
explaining an acquiring firm’s post-acquisition performance. From the perspective
of the 1990’s defense industry consolidation, this means that post-acquisition performance may be independent of whether an
“In an
acquiring firm’s industry
environment
is contracting. From the
with fewer comperspective of 1990’s
petitors, rivalry
often plays a
defense industry concoordinating
solidation, defense firms
role that imposes
should have been able to
competitive
adjust operations to susdiscipline on
tain performance in face
an industry.”
of DoD spending that in
2001 dollars declined
nearly 18 percent for R&D and 56 percent
for procurement between 1987 and 2000
(DoD, 2000).
Dynamism corresponds to uncertainty
or the degree of instability and unpredictable change in an industry (Dess & Beard,
1984). Environmental change itself does not
imply dynamism, instead dynamism exists
when change cannot be anticipated and adequately predicted, creating a situation where
integration and coordination are more difficult. Williamson (1975) suggests that under increasing environmental uncertainty
higher quality information could be
gained by managing transactions internally (i.e., making an acquisition). Current
results suggest that industry volatility in and
of itself does not impact post-acquisition
performance (p = .42; one tail). One
intrepretation of this result is that firms
adopt acquisition activity as a tool to

adapt to environmental change that helps
firms ensure their continued survival.
This is particularily relevant to the defense industry consolidation witnessed
during the 1990s.5
Complexity relates to the number and
diversity of other organizations a firm
must interact with (Dess & Beard, 1984).
Complexity is reflected in such factors as
the breadth and variety of a firm’s geographic markets, customers, suppliers, and
competitors. In general, fragmented industries are regarded as more complex than
concentrated industries (Keats & Hitt, 1988).
In an environment with fewer competitors,
rivalry often plays a coordinating role that
imposes competitive discipline on an
industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988). In contrast,
market power and resources are relatively
widely and evenly distributed among
numerous firms in fragmented industries,
creating heterogeneous conditions involving intense rivalry. Thus, the dynamics of
industry concentration may impact the
motivation and resulting performance
resulting from absorbing recognized
external technological capabilities.
Current results indicate that less complex (i.e., more concentrated industries)
lead to higher post-acquisition performance (p < .05; one tail). At first glance,
this result suggests that continued consolidation of the defense industry may be a
mistake in that further consolidation, at
this point, would result in two or fewer
prime contractors for primary weapon
system platforms (e.g., ships, aircraft,
tanks, satellites, missiles, etc.). Typically
this situation would raise concerns about
the ability of industry to retain either
enough competition or sustain innovation.
However, any monopolistic power in
defense firms is compensated by their
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facing a monopsony, or market with only
having a single customer (e.g., the DoD).
Additionally, the government audits the
cost of defense contracts and limits the
profit defense firms can earn from them.
It is unclear whether continued consolidation in the defense industry and any
anti-competitive impacts should be a
concern. Still, whether additional consolidation of defense firms occurs or not,
rationalization of production capacity
should be considered. Despite industry consolidation at the end of the 1990s, every
one of the eight military aircraft lines and
five military helicopter lines open at the
end of the Cold War were still in production (Sapolsky & Gholz, 1999). To a large
extent, the facilities responsible for producing 5, 195 F-4 Phantom II aircraft (Boeing,
2002) and other Cold War era weapons
continue to be maintained. Not even the
most optimistic projections predict the
same number of models or quantities of
future aircraft will be produced due largely
to improvements in capability6 and increased emphasis on jointness.

TIMING OF ACQUISITION
One possible explanation of an acquiring firm’s post-acquisition performance
consistent with population ecology
(Aldrich, 1979) is that early acquisitions
should outperform later acquisitions. An
acquisition represents an entry decision
for an acquiring firm that may involve
”selection” of firms with better resources
(Anand & Singh, 1997). Therefore, early
acquirers may be able to “select” the best
targets and later acquirers have a decreased and less desirable pool of targets
to select from. Although the timing of an
acquisition has been previously found to
be significant (Fowler & Schmidt, 1988),

few studies include time as an explanatory power and only Shelton (1988), in a
study of the impact of changing antitrust
regulations, attempts to explain time
differences in acquisition performance.
Current results suggest that the timing
of an acquisition is significant (p < .10) in
explaining an acquiring firm’s performance.
Based on one-tail significance tests, acquisitions completed in 1995 (p < .10) and
1996 (p < .05) performed significantly
worse than the 1994 reference category. However, the performance of
“It is unclear
acquisitions completed in
whether contin1997 is not significantly
ued consolidation
different from acquisiin the defense
tions completed in 1994.
industry and any
The results would appear
anti-competitive
impacts should
to show mixed support
be a concern.”
for early acquisitions outperforming later acquisitions. However, the nature
of the cross-sectional regression employed
assumes that the underlying pool of firms
does not change. There is significant turnover in high-technology industries with firms
both entering and exiting the market. The
non-significant difference between 1994 and
1997 may have resulted from the ability of
acquiring firms to select from a relatively diverse pool of targets in both years. Further
studying the impact of acquisition timing on
performance represents an opportunity for
future research.

CONCLUSION
In regard to the first research question,
there is clear evidence that firms use
acquisitions as a tool to gain access to technology. This finding has implications for
acquisitions of U.S. technology firms by
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foreign firms. Only national security and
not economic security reasons provide
grounds for disapproving an acquisition by
a foreign firm under the Exon-Florio foreign acquisition law. It is reported that the
DoD is considering cross-Atlantic defense
industry consolidation (Urwitz, 1999).
Based on the potential technology transfer implications and the demonstrated difficulty in predicting post-acquisition outcomes, encouraging cross-Atlantic defense
industry consolidation to realize cost savings may be misguided.
In regard to the second research question, acquisitions, on average, do not improve acquiring firm stock performance.
Completed analysis indicates that several
factors are correlated
with higher post-acquisition stock performance.
“In regard to
However, only four of the
defense industry
factors commonly assoconsolidation,
ciated with acquisition
results indicate it
performance that are unis not reasonable
der the control of manto expect consoligers appear to impact
dation will
achieve signifipost-acquisition stock
cant benefits
performance. First, the
in firm stock
acquisition of target firms
performance.”
in related industries appears to improve post-acquisition performance.
Second, the acquisition
of targets that remain smaller than an acquiring firm, but are still of a sufficient
size, leads to higher post-acquisition performance. Third, acquiring firms that
carry lower debt levels are more likely to
experience higher post-acquisition performance. Fourth, acquisitions completed
using tender offers lead to higher performance. Combined, these four factors

explain only 12 percent of the observed
variance in post-acquisition performance.
This is consistent with existing acquisition research that in general explains “less
than 10 percent” of the variance in the
stock performance of acquiring firms
(Sirower, 1997, p. 158). Clearly the dollar
value and volume of acquisition activity
requires a better understanding of this phenomenon. Therefore, we also considered
the impact of external factors on postacquisition stock performance.
External factors relating to an acquiring firm’s industry munificence and timing of an acquisition explain 7.1 percent
of the variance in post-acquisition stock
performance. Stated differently, 37.2 percent of the explained variance in the current study is due to external factors that
are beyond direct control and the majority of variance still remains unexplained
after including the most common factors
in M&A research in our model. In total,
this study only explains 19.1 percent
(F = 2.12; p = .015) of the variance in
post-acquisition performance. This
means that the majority of variance in
post-acquisition stock performance remains unexplained and suggests that
government policy aimed at influencing high-technology M&A activity may
be misguided since any government
intervention may have opposite the desired effect. Additionally, antitrust policies in high-technology industries may
be less relevant because the high rate
of technology change may keep firms
from establishing and exercising monopoly powers.
In regard to defense industry consolidation, results indicate it is not reasonable to expect consolidation will
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achieve significant benefits in firm
stock performance. Although considerations of defense industry stock performance may be secondary to the governments interests in the short-term, it
is of concern in the long-term because
it impacts the attractiveness of the industry to employees and investors. The
long-term success and health of the defense industry requires attracting the best
employees (Defense Science Board,
2000) and maintaining the ability of
defense firms to utilize the capital
markets. However, a significant portion
of high-technology firm employees comes
from stock options, and poor performing
defense firms would be less able to attract

and retain the best engineers. Considering additional performance measures for
the defense industry represents an opportunity for future research.
In closing, the present research reviews
current post-acquisition stock performance literature to test factors impacting
the post-acquisition stock performance of
firms that acquire high-technology targets.
Results of the study show that internal and
extenal factors do not provide a clear
guidance for managers or government
policy makers. Additional research, especially focused on the defense industry
and its unique market, is needed if factors are to be found that can be used to
influence industrial policy.
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APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This appendix describes in detail the
research methodology used beginning
with the sample. The discussion of the
sample is followed by a description of
the operationalization of all variables
and their data sources. Finally, the statistical procedure is summarized.

SAMPLE
The sample used for this study focused
on public, high-technology firms that
were acquired between January 1, 1994
and December 31, 1997 and had a market capitalization of at least $10 million.
This focus enabled us to isolate acquisitions of a specific type and to avoid studying a cross-section of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity that may introduce
extraneous effects. Additionally, the time
frame offered control over known impacts
of the business cycle on acquisition activity (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989)
by ensuring all measurement was limited
to a period of favorable economic conditions. A $10 million market capitalization
restriction is consistent with the lower
bound observed in previous acquisition
research (e.g., Finkelstein, 1997;
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) and was
intended to ensure target firms were
large enough to impact acquiring firm
performance.
High-technology target firms were
identified as those that (1) were in twodigit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code industries commonly recognized as high-technology, and (2) displayed moderate research and development (R&D) intensity prior to being acquired.

Existing literature commonly recognizes
seven two-digit industry sectors as hightechnology industries: Chemicals [28],
Computer Equipment [35], Electronics
[36], the aerospace industry [Transportation: 37], Instruments [38], Communications [48], and the software industry [Business Services: 73] (e.g., Certo, Daily, &
Dalton, 2001). Moderate R&D intensity
was operationally defined as R&D-toSales of two percent or greater. This value
was based on rounding up from what has
been reported as the overall industry average R&D-to-Sales figure of 1.5 percent
(e.g., Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). This
enabled us to conservatively and objectively identify target firms as reasonably
R&D intensive without unduly restricting the sample. After applying these
screens, a census of 312 high-technology
firms was identified.
To identify the final sample, however,
two additional restrictions were applied.
First, acquisitions were eliminated if the
target and acquiring firms’ SIC codes
were not identified by COMPUSTAT to
the four-digit SIC level. This controlled
for industry effects and allowed the use
of a categorical entropy diversification
measure for firm relatedness. It also
offered the benefit of controlling for
potential confounding effects of conglomerate firms. Second, acquiring firms had
to be available in the Center for Research
on Security Prices (CRSP) database to allow us to calculate several of our measures
(e.g., Jensen’s alpha, the premium paid,
and relative size). The final sample
includes 133 firm pairs.
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MEASURES
This section explains the operationalization for each variable beginning with
the dependent stock performance variable, and then the explanatory variables
in the order they are discussed in the paper.
Firm Performance. Jensen’s alpha
(Alexander & Francis, 1986), a variation
of the two-parameter market model, was
used to measure an acquiring firm’s
performance. For each month after an
acquisition (t = 1 to 36), the regression
model shown in Figure 1 was calculated.
As the regression intercept, Jensen’s
alpha measures the average difference
between the market benchmark’s return
and the return of the firm (Alexander &
Francis, 1986), or abnormal return. If
Jensen’s alpha is not significantly different from zero, then a firm’s stock performance is the same as the market benchmark. Once calculated for each firm,
Jensen’s alpha is used as the dependent
variable in a cross-sectional analysis to
test independent variable effects. This application of cross-sectional analysis allows the association between an event

and abnormal returns to be observed
(Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997).
Individual firm stock and market benchmark monthly rates of return were collected from the CRSP database with the
S&P500® index serving as the market
benchmark.
Diversification. The relatedness of an
acquisition was measured as a categorical entropy measure (Hoskisson, Hitt,
Johnson, & Moesel, 1993) where relatedness varies based on the degree that
target and acquiring firm primary fourdigit SIC codes match. An unrelated acquisition (value = 0) is defined as the acquisition of a target firm in a four-digit
SIC outside an acquiring firm’s two-digit
industry group. The first level of related
acquisitions occurs when an acquiring
and target firms two-digit industry groups
match (value = 1). Similarly, when an acquiring and target firms SIC code matches
to three- and four-digits relatedness, values of two and three will be assigned respectively.
Relative size. The relative size of
firms was calculated similar to Sirower
(1997) as the ratio of target firm market

where:
is the monthly rate of return of firm i during month t
is Jensen’s alpha for firm i
is a firm i’s stock price variance relative to the variance of the market benchmark (m)
is the monthly rate of return of the market benchmark (m) during month t
is the random error term
Figure 1. Regression Model
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capitalization divided by acquiring firm
market capitalization. Market capitalization was calculated from either the
CRSP or Security Data Corporation
(SDC) database four weeks prior to an
acquisition announcement.
Acquisition Experience. Acquisition
experience was operationalized similar to
Hayward (2002) with an acquiring firm’s
acquisition experience recorded as the sum
of a firm’s acquisitions for the previous
three years. Acquisition experience was
measured prior high-technology acquisition experience of an acquirer in the three
years prior to the acquisition of interest.
Method of Accounting. The method
of accounting for an acquisition was measured by using a dichotomous dummy
variable (pooling = 0 and purchase = 1).
Information on method of accounting was
identified from either the SDC database
or an online search of business press.
R&D Expenditures. An acquirer’s
R&D expenditures were measured using
R&D intensity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989,
1990) minus the average R&D intensity
of firms in its industry to control for
industry effects (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt,
1990). The resulting relative R&D intensity measure was averaged for the prior
three years to represent a firm’s level of
commitment to developing technological
capability, while controlling for annual
variation. Firm and industry R&D intensity were calculated using data available
from COMPUSTAT: R&D expenditures
(data code 46) divided by sales (data code
12). Industry R&D intensity was calculated from COMPUSTAT by calculating
the average R&D intensity for all firms
with the same four-digit SIC code.
Acquiring Firm Debt. The level of
an acquiring firm’s debt was measured

using the current ratio. It was calculated
by dividing a firm’s current assets by
its current liabilities with data from
COMPUSTAT — data codes 4 and 5
respectively.
Form of Acquisition. The form of
acquisition, merger or tender offer, was
measured using a dichotomous dummy
variable (merger = 0 and tender offer =
1). Information on the form of an acquisition was identified from either the SDC
database or an online search of popular
business press.
Target Firm Performance. The industry adjusted profitability of a target
firm was measured by calculating a target firm’s Return-on-Sales (ROS) in the
year prior to its being acquired. Profitability was measured using ROS for each
firm the year prior to an acquisition, and
was obtained from COMPUSTAT: net income (data code 172) divided by sales
(data code 12).
Firm Environment. A firm’s environment was measured using the three environmental dimensions of munificence,
dynamism, and concentration computed
at the four-digit SIC level using the procedure described by Keats and Hitt
(1988) and calculated for the five preceding years, beginning in the year prior
to acquisition. Succinctly, munificence
is the average of the regression coefficients of a four-digit industry’s net sales
and operating income over the preceding five-year period. Dynamism is the
average of the standard errors of the regression slopes for the two munificence
regression equations. Complexity is a
market concentration measure computed
by regressing the terminal-year (i.e., year
five) market shares of the firms in a
given industry on these firms’ initial-year
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(i.e., year one) market shares. Note: lower
values on the complexity scale signify
higher levels of complexity.
Timing of Acquisition. The year, or time
impact, of an acquisition was measured

using a polychotomous dummy variable
(1995 = 1, 1996 = 2, and 1997 = 3) with
the year 1994 serving as the reference category.

277

Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2003

ANALYSIS
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
used to identify the significance and individual level of variance explained by
independent variables (Bray & Maxwell,
1985). Supplemental analysis was used to
determine if the assumptions (the same as
regression) of analytical technique were
met. Graphs of error terms were consistent with conclusions that the are normally
distributed. Further, none of the variable
bivariate correlations exceeded .5, indicating that multicollinearity should not be
a concern (Gujarati, 1995, p. 335). The
data from independent firms over different time periods were combined in a
cross-sectional analysis, and would not

be expected to exhibit autocorrelation
commonly associated with time series
data (see Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993).
However, the cross-sectional analysis of
data over several years and the significant difference between the year an acquisition was made may indicate a violation of the constant variance assumption (see Griffiths, Hall, & Judge, 1993).
Supplementary analysis using the
Goldfeld-Quandt F-test showed none of
the year-year and full model
combinations are significant. This suggests
that variance across the different years
is homoskedastic, or displays constant
variance.
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ENDNOTES
1. Please see the Appendix for a description of the study’s methodology.

5. We would like to thank Steven L.
Schooner of George Washington
University Law School for making this observation.

2. The authors were unable to confirm
that Tinsley was ever divested from
ASM Lithography.
3. The potential implication is that existing M&A research may be biased
by model under-specification (see
Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993: 312).

6. A single F-117 mission can accomplish today what 95 sorties
achieved during Vietnam or what
4,500 B-17 bombers achieved
during WWII (Toffler & Toffler,
1993).

4. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board eliminated pooling of interests accounting and modified recording of goodwill with purchase
accounting for all acquisitions completed after July 1, 2001.
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